Using Laboratory Experiments For Policy Making: An Example From The Georgia Irrigation Reduction Auction by Charles A. Holt et al.
 
 -1- 
 
 
 
 
USING LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS FOR POLICY MAKING: 
AN EXAMPLE FROM THE GEORGIA IRRIGATION REDUCTION 
AUCTION 
 
 
 
Ronald G. Cummings, Charles A. Holt, and Susan K. Laury* 
 
 
 
 
April 2002 
 
 
 
Abstract:  In April 2000, the Georgia legislature passed a law requiring that the state use 
an unspecified “auction- like process” to pay some farmers to suspend irrigation in 
declared drought years. In response, we conducted a series of laboratory and field 
experiments to test a variety of auction procedures.  This paper reports the results of these 
experiments, and how they were used by the policy makers who determined the auction 
procedures. Experimental results are compared with farmers’ bidding behavior in the 
state-run irrigation auction conducted in March 2001. 
 
 
 
Corresponding Author: 
Susan K. Laury 
Department of Economics 
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies 
Georgia State University 
Atlanta, GA 30303-3083 
 
Keywords: experiment, auction, irrigation 
                                                 
* Cummings and Laury: Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, University 
Plaza, Atlanta, GA 30303-3083. Holt: Economics, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904-4182 
(Holt was also a visiting scholar at Georgia State during the spring and summer of 2001). The authors 
gratefully acknowledge funding from the Georgia State University Experimental Economics Laboratory, 
the National Science Foundation (SBR-0094800), and the University of Virginia Bankard Fund for 
Political Economy. 
 
 -2- 
USING LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS FOR POLICY MAKING: 
AN EXAMPLE FROM THE GEORGIA IRRIGATION REDUCTION AUCTION 
 
Abstract:  In April 2000, the Georgia legislature passed a law requiring that the state use 
an unspecified “auction- like process” to pay some farmers to suspend irrigation in 
declared drought years. In response, we conducted a series of laboratory and field 
experiments to test a variety of auction procedures.  This paper reports the results of these 
experiments, and how they were used by the policy makers who determined the auction 
procedures. Experimental results are compared with farmers’ bidding behavior in the 
state-run irrigation auction conducted in March 2001. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In April, 2000, the Georgia Legislature enacted the Flint River Drought Protection 
Act.1  The state was entering a third year of drought and Georgia=s primary water 
manager, the Environmental Protection Division (EPD), was concerned that the exercise 
of existing water use permits could reduce flows in the Flint River to levels that might 
cause serious harm to the Basin=s ecological systems in general, and to endangered 
species in particular.  The Drought Protection Act was designed to reduce irrigated 
acreage (which accounts for more than 70% of consumptive water use in the Basin) 
during drought years.  On March 1 of each year, the Director of the EPD is required to 
announce whether or not the upcoming summer will be characterized by severe drought 
conditions.  If a drought is declared, the Director is then required to determine the 
number of acres that must be taken out of irrigation to maintain acceptable river flows.  
He then implements an Aauction-like@ process wherein farmers may offer to voluntarily 
forego irrigation of all2 lands covered by a specific water use permit for the remainder of 
the calendar year, in exchange for a one-time lump sum payment (determined by the 
auction).  The Georgia Legislature set aside $10 million of funds derived from the multi-
state Tobacco industry settlement for use in compensating these farmers. 
                                                 
1 O.C.G.A. 12-5-540 through 12-5-550. 
2 Reflecting issues related to enforcement, farmers were not allowed to offer partial reductions in acreage 
covered by a specific water use permit.  Offers could be made only to take all lands covered by the permit 
out of irrigation for the balance of the year.  If, as was often the case, a farmer held more than one permit, 
he/she could offer to take all lands covered by one permit out of irrigation, but continue to irrigate all lands 
covered by permits with offers not accepted in the auction. 
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After learning of the Act’s auction provisions, we immediately initiated a program 
of research aimed at assisting the EPD in their efforts to define the substance of the 
Aauction- like process@ that they might be (and ultimately were) required to implement.   
An appropriate design for such an auction was not immediately obvious.  The necessary 
characteristics were somewhat unique vis-a-vis received auction literature in a number of 
ways.3  Unlike (as contemporary examples) the SO2 and FCC bandwidth auctions that 
involve a single or multiple seller(s) facing many buyers, the water use permit (hereafter, 
simply “irrigation”) auction involves a single, budget-constrained, buyer facing many 
sellers.4  The value of irrigation to farmers in this region contains both private value and 
common value components.  Since most farmers use irrigation for one or more of three 
major crops, (corn, cotton, and peanuts), we concluded that sellers have relatively good 
common information about the value of irrigation to other sellers, subject to some 
uncertainty about price and weather.  In contrast, differences in permit size, soil quality, 
and location produced variations in per-acre productivities of irrigated land, which we 
modeled as “private value” differences.  Finally, any effort to design an auction 
mechanism for this application would have to reflect obvious incentives for sellers 
(farmers who know one another) to attempt to collude. 
The purpose of this paper is to describe our efforts to evaluate alternative auction 
mechanisms to implement the Act=s requirements.  Our goal was to design an auction that 
provides farmers with an incentive to reveal their true costs of foregoing irrigation, under 
the constraints imposed upon the auction by the law and available budget.  The subjects 
were mostly students in laboratory settings designed to mimic likely characteristics of the 
actual auction, such as easy communication between sellers and large numbers of sellers.  
We also made use of adult subjects and farmers in field conditions.  These field 
experiments were held at local facilities in farming communities. 
                                                 
3  For discussions of auctions for bandwidth and pollution permits, see Cramton (2000, 2002) and the 
experimental results in Banks, Olson, Porter, Rassenti, and Smith (2001). 
 
4 To provide some degree of perspective for the EPD=s budget constraint of $10 million, in a severe drought 
year the EPD=s target acreage reduction could be on the order of 100,000 acres (out of a total of some 
600,000 to 800,000 irrigated acres).  Achievement of the target would require that the average price/acre 
paid in the auction not exceed $100, which is seen by many as the lower bound on rental values for 
irrigated land in the Basin. 
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In section II, we discuss the institutional considerations that determined the basic 
experimental design and treatments.  Modifications based on pilot experiments are 
reviewed in section III. Section IV presents results from laboratory experiments of 
various scales (from 9 to 42 participants) using various pricing, bid revision, and 
information provision rules. The results of two field experiments are reported in section 
V, one with subjects that were primarily farmers and one that was a multi-site auction 
with 50 people drawn from the local population at two sites in southwest Georgia, just 
two months prior to the actual auction. The bids in this trial run were collected using a 
web-based program that enabled the Director of the EPD to watch the bidding from 
Atlanta.5 Section VI describes how our recommendations were implemented, and 
summarizes the results of the EPD auction, which involved 194 farmers at 8 Flint River 
basin locations. The final section concludes. 
 
II. IMPLEMENTING THE IRRIGATION AUCTION IN LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS 
 Because our work was motivated by a specific policy question, the experiments 
that we conducted included more context and fewer controls than is typical for laboratory 
experiments.  The first part of this section provides details on the institutional context for 
the irrigation auction.  The second part outlines our experimental implementation. 
 
Institutional Considerations 
 There were many institutional details that we considered and mimicked in our 
experiments.  First, there are many potential “sellers” (farmers) and only one “buyer” (the 
EPD).  We use the terms buyer and seller to correspond to traditional auction theory and 
design, however nothing is being “bought” or “sold” in this auction.  To be more precise 
(and legally accurate) farmers make offers to suspend irrigation for the remainder of the 
calendar year.  These offers may be accepted or rejected by the EPD.  Farmers, however, 
retain their land and their irrigation permit regardless of the outcome of the auction. 
                                                 
5  The program, written by Krawee Ackaramongkolrotn at Georgia State University, was also used in the 
final auction. 
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Some farmers have more than one irrigation permit, and the value of the land is 
not homogenous across farmers.  In fact, one farmer may hold irrigation permits for land 
that is used to grow different crops, and therefore has different values, depending on 
which crop he plants that year.  The auction must be implemented and finalized quickly 
(within 25 days) after a drought declaration is made.  Moreover, it must be able to 
accommodate a potentially large number of farmers, who are located over a broad area of 
southwest Georgia.  Not all of these farmers have internet access, and some are not 
comfortable with computers.  While the EPD will have a target number of acres that they 
wish to take out of irrigation, they also have a fixed budget constraint that is likely to be 
binding.  The maximum budget is public knowledge, but the target acreage need not be.  
Finally, the institution should be “collusion-proof” given that many of those participating 
in the auction know one another and will have ample opportunity prior to (or during) the 
auction to discuss bidding strategies. 
 Irrigation systems in this region are not metered.  Therefore it was not possible to 
implement a system in which a given farmer reduces irrigation to a target amount.  In 
order to have more manageable enforcement, regulators decided that any offer to suspend 
irrigation required no irrigation take place on any of the land covered by the permit.  For 
example, if a single irrigation permit covered three distinct fields, an offer to suspend 
irrigation means that no irrigation will occur on any of the three fields.  However, if a 
farmer had more than one irrigation permit, the farmer could offer to suspend irrigation 
under one and still irrigate land covered by another. 
  An offer to suspend irrigation merely states that the farmer is willing to forego 
irrigating for the remainder of the calendar year in exchange for the specified (per-acre) 
payment.  The farmer can still use the land, and in fact can still plant crops on the land.  
While dry-cropping (planting without irrigating) is possible, we believe it is unlikely that 
the land will be used for agricultural purposes.  Beginning January 1 of the following 
year the farmer is free to irrigate once again. 
There were political considerations as well.  The outcome of the auction should 
not be considered to be either “wasteful” or “unfair.”  There is a large variance in the 
quality of land (and the crops grown), both within and across regions.  Many therefore 
perceived that a fair pricing system would entail paying different amounts to farmers with 
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different values.  In addition, in a uniform price auction there was the potential of 
negative publicity if a farmer offered to suspend irrigation for a very low amount but was 
paid a much higher amount determined by the uniform market clearing price.  While we 
compared uniform and discriminative pricing in our initial experiments, described below, 
we narrowed our focus when it became obvious to us that a uniform-price mechanism 
would not be seriously considered by the EPD. 
 Typically one considers an auction successful if the outcome is efficient.  In this 
context, this entails not only the "right" price resulting from the auction, but also that 
those farmers with the lowest land values have their offers accepted.  However, the 
EPD’s primary goal was simply to take the maximum number of acres out of irrigation 
within the fixed budget constraint.6  This was particularly important given that most 
thought it was unlikely that they would be able to meet their target acreage within the 
budget they had to work with.  Efficiency was a secondary concern to them. 
 Finally, because an auction like this had never been conducted in this region (and 
is expected to happen only infrequently), it is important that the rules and procedures be 
clear, easily understood, and also easy to implement.  In particular, it was of utmost 
importance that all farmers understand precisely how the ir payment would be determined 
by their offer prices. 
 
Laboratory Implementation 
In the typical laboratory experiment, neutral terminology is used for goods of an 
unspecified nature, in order to preclude the possibility that valuations may be biased by 
experiment context. Moreover, subjects are often visually isolated from one another, and 
are not allowed to communicate (unless this communication is a treatment variable).  The 
complexity of the auction procedures being discussed convinced us that a fair amount of 
context would be useful to reduce confusion, and we did not think vague beliefs about 
land rental rates would affect induced values that were several orders of magnitude lower. 
Therefore, subjects in these experiments were told: 
                                                 
6 Ideally, the EPD would suspend irrigation on land with the most intensive water use; however they have 
no information that makes this possible. 
 
 -7- 
In this auction, each of you will be in the position of a farmer who has 
three “permits” to irrigate acres of land.  These irrigation permits allow 
you to irrigate the land and earn money on crops that you grow.  We (the 
experimenters) are in the position of a government agency charged with 
controlling water use.  We will use an auction- like process to buy some of 
these permits back from you in order to reduce the amount of water being 
taken from river and ground water reserves in this area.  
 
This context-specific terminology proved to be useful when we wrote instructions for the 
actual auction that followed a year later. 
We used induced values to determine the supply function for irrigation permits.  
The subject was told the (per-acre) value for each permit that was held.  If the permit was 
not sold, the subject would definitely earn this amount of money, multiplied by the 
number of acres covered by the permit.  If the permit was sold, the subject would not earn 
this money, and would instead earn the negotiated per-acre price multiplied by the 
number of acres covered by the permit.  The certain value of a held permit is a 
simplification of the actual situation facing farmers, since crop price is not known with 
certainty in advance. Roughly 75 percent of the acreage in this region is in corn and 
cotton, and this is also the acreage with the lowest profit margins.  Farmers in this area 
are clearly price-takers in these crops (reducing acreage would have no effect on market 
prices), and therefore have a good idea of the costs and prices that they face.  The 
remaining acreage is in peanuts.  Because profit margins are higher, and also because of 
peanut quotas, we considered it very unlikely that any peanut acreage would be offe red in 
the auction at prices close to those that were being accepted. 
After the initial sequence of experiments, we were concerned that the laboratory 
environment inhibited the communication that would certainly occur among farmers in 
an actual irrigation auction.  Therefore, we conducted the majority of our sessions in an 
open lobby area outside of the laboratory, or in a large meeting room, depending on the 
number of participants.  Refreshments were provided, and subjects were encouraged to 
talk with one another.  The auctions were conducted using a series of five-minute offer 
submission rounds.  Subjects were told: “while you are waiting to turn in your offer 
submission card (or simply waiting for the end of the 5-minute period), feel free to talk 
with the others and to enjoy the refreshments.”  The experimenters were available to 
answer questions, but typically kept their distance (sometimes standing in another nearby 
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room) so that they did not inhibit any conversation.  During the largest experiments and  
in the EPD auction, the people running the auction wore red baseball caps so that they 
could be easily identified in the event that there were questions or problems.  For the 
majority of experiments, subjects were students at Georgia State University. 
Even before draft rules of the auction were released by the EPD, farmers in the 
affected area of the state were discussing the auction.  We expected them to come to the 
auction having discussed the auction and bidding strategies amongst themselves prior to 
the auction.  In order to better simulate this level of experience, some subjects 
participated in several auction experiments.  About 40 percent of our subjects participated 
in more than one session.  Therefore our auctions involved a mix of experienced and 
inexperienced subjects.  We did, however, shift the land values (and budget constraint) by 
a constant between sessions in order to change the competitive price between sessions. 
Also, because we expected many of the farmers to know one another, we placed no 
restrictions on friends or family members participating together in these experiments (this 
is typically avoided wherever possible in economics experiments).  For example, we 
know of several cases where spouses, siblings, and parents participated together. 
 Subjects did, in fact, talk with one another during the sessions.  Because 
communication was not a treatment per se (instead we were trying to parallel the 
naturally occurring environment) we did not monitor the conversations or keep 
transcripts.  We did observe that subjects sometimes engaged in small talk, and at other 
times talked about the auction itself.  Because we wanted to ensure that any auction 
mechanism that we recommended would be relatively collusion-proof, we were happy 
that bidding strategies were discussed and attempts at collusion occurred in most 
sessions. 
 Overall, 90 subjects participated in 20 auctions held during 11 sessions in April 
and May 2000 (some subjects participated in as many as three auctions).  Most sessions 
lasted for two hours (the 42-person session was scheduled to last 4 hours), and earnings 
ranged from $36.62 to $99.88, with an average of $63.74. 
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III. PILOT EXPERIMENTS: PRICING RULES AND REVISIONS 
In our first pilot sessions, subjects participated in more than one auction, which 
allowed us to test a variety of institutions quickly before narrowing our focus to one or 
two sets of rules. 
The design and land values used in the last two pilot sessions most closely 
resembled those conducted subsequently.  Therefore, we will report only the results from 
these sessions. Subjects in both participated in two sealed-offer auctions: a discriminative 
(own-price) and uniform-price auction.  They also participated in a final (uniform-price) 
auction in which they were allowed to revise their offers after preliminary results were 
announced.  In one session the uniform price was set equal to the lowest rejected offer 
price, and in the other session it was set equal to the highest accepted offer price.  We 
were interested in how the average price paid, number of acres obtained in the auction, 
and efficiency were affected by the choice of institution and the opportunity to revise 
offers based on market information.  In order to minimize order and information effects 
we first conducted the one-shot (no revision) auctions without providing any feedback on 
the results.  Therefore when the iterative auctions were conducted, subjects had 
previously submitted offers, but had not observed the outcome from either one-shot 
auction. 
A uniform price auction is typically preferred because it is incentive compatible to 
bid one's own value (at least when one's bid cannot determine the market-clearing 
uniform price).  However, because subjects in our experiments (like farmers who were to 
be participants in the auction) had multiple permits, neither pricing rule we tested is 
theoretically incentive compatible (Smith, Williams, Bratton, and Vannoni, 1982; 
Ausubel and Cramton, 1998).  To see this, think about a farmer making offers for two 
permits.  If one offer is accepted, it is possible that his offer on the second (rejected) 
permit could determine the market-clearing price.  In this (multi-unit) environment 
bidding one's value is incentive compatible only if the price is determined by the lowest 
rejected offer that is not one's own. 7 We did not consider such a pricing rule, however, 
because of the complexity of explaining and implementing it.  Moreover, it wasn't clear 
                                                 
7  List and Lucking-Reiley (2000) document such demand withholding behavior in field experiments when 
a simple uniform price auction is used. 
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to us that farmers would understand the incentive to bid value in such a complicated 
environment. 
In each auction subjects knew their own land values, the range of values, the 
number of participants, and the fixed budget.  They were told that we had a target number 
of acres that we wanted to take out of irrigation, and that we would accept as many offers 
as possible until we either reached this target or expended our budget.  Subjects were not 
told the target number of acres.  Moreover, in the auctions with revisions, subjects did not 
know how many revision rounds would be conducted. 
In these auctions we did not observe a consistent difference between the uniform 
and discriminative auctions.  In one session, the uniform price was below the average 
price paid in the discriminative auction.  However, two accepted offers were substantially 
higher than others in the discriminative auction, pulling up the average.  In the second 
session the average prices were identical.  More evidence comparing the uniform and 
discriminative auctions will be presented below.  Similarly, there is little difference in the 
uniform price auctions between a price based on the highest accepted offer and the lowest 
rejected offer. 
The basic procedures of the auction with revisions were the same as those for the 
one-shot auction.  After all offers had been submitted in writing, they were ranked from 
low to high.  The lowest priced offers were then "provisionally" accepted.  After the 
provisional winners were announced, all subjects (regardless of the status of their offer) 
were given the opportunity to turn in a revised offer.  If no new offer was turned in, the 
previous offer stood.  The new offers were then ranked, and new provisional winners 
were announced.  This process continued until either no one wished to submit a revised 
offer or the experimenters chose to end the auction.  In this case, the provisional 
acceptances from the most recently completed round became final acceptances.  Subjects 
did not know in advance which would be the final offer round. 
We placed no restrictions on the revisions.  Therefore a subject who initially 
submitted a high offer price could lower their offer (provided another revision round was 
held).  Similarly, a subject who submitted a very low offer could increase it, even if the 
offer was provisionally accepted.  Of course, doing so involved the risk that the subject 
would be excluded from the market at the new offer price. 
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A key issue here is how to announce the provisional winners.  In particular we 
considered whether we should simply announce which offers were accepted (identified in 
an anonymous manner, for example by permit ID number) or announce the cut-off offer 
price that determined which offers were accepted.  We thought that it would be 
cumbersome to announce each ID number, especially in the actual auction with 
potentially hundreds of farmers.  Therefore, we chose to announce only the cutoff price 
("All offers at or below $1.20 were provisionally accepted"), however, this is a treatment 
that we consider below. 
Across revision rounds, the average accepted offer price generally declined (from 
$1.11 in the first round to a low of $1.04 in round 3) in one session, and was flat in the 
second session (see Figure 1).  In both of these auctions the uniform clearing price was 
below the competitive prediction of $1.10, obtained by intersecting the supply function 
(locus of ranked opportunity costs) with a demand function that is the locus of points 
where the price multiplied by the number of acres exactly matches the budget constraint. 
This sub-competitive result reflects the fact that some subjects were making offers below 
value, which suggests that some subjects were almost certainly confused about how their 
earnings were determined.  We addressed this in follow-up experiments, described below. 
The most important result to come out of these initial experiments is that 
inefficiency decreases dramatically when subjects are given preliminary results and 
allowed to revise offers.  Our measure of inefficiency is the amount by which the 
opportunity cost (the value of a permit that is kept) of the accepted offers exceeds the 
minimum opportunity cost of the number of acres accepted in the auction.  If the lowest-
valued permits are obtained in the auction (regardless of the price paid for them) this 
measure will equal zero.  When higher-opportunity cost permits are obtained instead of 
lower opportunity cost units, this measure will increase.  Inefficiency is shown on the 
right axis of Figure 1, and peaks in the first or second revision round.  By the final 
(fourth) revision round the "right" (minimum opportunity cost) offers are typically 
accepted. 
As noted earlier, efficiency was not one of the EPD's primary goals.  A one-shot 
sealed offer auction would be much easier to implement.  Farmers could mail in their 
offers, which would then be sorted by policy-makers.  We need a strong justification for 
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the additional time and expense of conducting an auction with revisions (which by 
necessity involves taking workers into the field).  One reason is simply to insure against a 
bad outcome.  Given that this type of auc tion had never been conducted before, policy-
makers would like some assurance that prices would be at a “reasonable” level.  If, for 
example, a simple sealed offer auction is conducted and the submitted offers are 
extremely high, very few offers would be accepted.  Allowing for revisions gives farmers 
a chance to think about the situation and to respond to policy-makers’ decisions and the 
bidding behavior of others.  Allowing for these revisions could minimize the chance that 
farmers will come out of the auction wishing that they could do something differently.  
Given the potential political repercussions of a poor outcome, or unhappy farmers, this is 
a big advantage of implementing an auction with revisions.  Moreover, holding other 
factors constant, an ins titution that results in more efficient outcomes (and therefore, 
presumably, participants who are more satisfied with the outcome) is preferable.  This is 
a strong argument in favor using an auction mechanism that includes the opportunity to 
revise offers. 
 
IV. LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS 
This section describes the treatments that we tested in the lab, and the results from 
auctions using each of these treatments.  We conducted a single auction in each session, 
varying treatments between sessions.  Among the factors considered were: the tie-
breaking rules, uniform versus discriminative pricing, number of participants and the 
information provided about cutoff offers. 
 
Training Subjects to Understand the Institution 
After observing that some subjects consistently bid below value in our pilot 
experiments, we were concerned that participants might be confused about how their 
earnings were determined in the auction.  There were two potential sources of confusion:  
how much they earned if they retained a permit, and how their earnings were determined 
in the event that an offer was accepted.  In a typical experiment, decisions are made over 
a series of rounds, and earnings are reported at the end of each round.  This was not the 
 
 -13- 
case in our experiment.  If a subject was confused about how earnings were calculated, 
they received no information during the experiment that would eliminate this confusion. 
Because of this we used extensive instructions (contained in the appendix) to 
explain the procedures and how earnings were calculated.  Participants were asked to 
calculate their earnings for each permit that was not sold in the auction.  In addition, the 
experimenter publicly worked through examples of how earnings would be calculated if 
offers on no permits or some permits were accepted.  These examples used prices that 
were quite different than any potential prices in the market.  Finally, participants worked 
through two practice auctions using real goods (for example, pens or post-it notes).  In 
the first practice auction, subjects were endowed with one unit of a good (for example, a 
single pad of post- it notes).  After the fixed budget was announced (typically several 
dollars), subjects submitted the price at which they would be willing to sell the good back 
to the experimenter.  Offers were publicly recorded and ranked on a transparency and the 
lowest-priced offers were accepted until the budget had been expended.  Those 
participants whose offers were accepted were paid (either the uniform or discriminative 
price, depending on the treatment) and the item was taken from them.  It was emphasized 
that those participants whose offers were accepted received the money but not the value 
to them of the good.  The others received no money but were still able to use the good.  
The second auction was identical to the first, except that subjects were given two possibly 
heterogeneous units of the good (for example, a blue pen and a black pen) to more 
closely correspond to the multi-unit auction design.  While this did not keep all subjects 
from bidding below value in subsequent auctions, very few cases of this were observed. 
 
Tie-Breaking Rules 
 Given a fixed budget constraint, the possibility exists that a tie could occur at the 
highest accepted price.  For example, suppose the budget was $10 and the ranked offers 
in a discriminative auction were: $0.50, $1.00, $2.00, $3.00, $3.00, $3.00, $5.00, and 
$10.50.  In this case, we could accept all offers below $3.00, but only 2 of the 3 offers at 
$3.00. 
 In one (uniform-price) session, a subject asked how we would choose which 
offers to accept if there was a tie such as the one described above.  We responded that we 
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would accept all offers at this price, “even if we have to go a little above our budget.” 
Figure 2 shows the results from this session (and a paired session, described below).  The 
induced supply and demand arrays are shown on the left side of the graph. The supply 
curve is simply the permit values, ranked from low to high.  The demand side of the 
market comes from the experimenters, and is determined by the fixed budget constraint.  
For example, in this market the budget constraint was $160.  Therefore we could afford 
to buy one acre at a price of $160 per acre, 4 acres at a price of $40 per acre, or 160 acres 
at a price of $1 per acre.  The demand curve traces out the locus of these points where the 
price multiplied by the number of acres exactly matches the budget constraint.  In this 
session, the uniform competitive price was $1.10 (prices on the graph are shown in 
pennies).  We define this price as the one at which the number of acres that would be 
offered in the market if all bid value (144 acres) is just what we could afford to purchase 
at a uniform price within our fixed ($160) budget.8 
The right side of Figure 2 shows the time series (across revision rounds) of 
average accepted prices obtained in this market (shown in the "inclusive tie-breaking 
rule" line).9  In the first offer round, if we had observed our $160 budget constraint, we 
would have accepted two of these offers (plus six offers at lower prices), for a total of 
112 acres at a cost of $134.40.  However, because of our announced procedure of 
accepting all offers at the tied level, we provisionally accepted offers for 160 acres at a 
total cost of $192.  In the second round the highest accepted offer price fell to $1.15, and 
there was once again a tie.  As additional revision rounds continued, almost all permits 
with a value below $1.15 were submitted at this level – even those with very low values 
in this uniform price auction.  By round 6, there were 18 accepted offers.  All but five of 
these were submitted at $1.15.  We retired a total of 288 acres (double the competitive 
level), and spent $331.20: over double our budget.  Extrapolating to the actual problem 
                                                 
8  If we assume that all will bid 1-cent above value in order to avoid indifference, the price would be $1.11, 
and 144 acres could still be retired while staying within the fixed budget. 
 
9  Because the highest accepted offer is the one (uniform) price paid for all accepted offers, this is also the 
average price paid.  For consistency with subsequent figures that show data from discriminative auctions, 
we label this as the average price. 
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faced by the EPD, this translates into spending over $20 million when the available 
budget is $10 million. 
 Later on the same day we conducted a second session (with a different group of 
participants).  This session was identical (number of participants, parameter values, and 
procedures), except for an announcement that, in the event of a tie, we would randomly 
choose among offers at the tied level in order to stay within our budget constraint.  The 
initial offers were quite similar to the first session (and are shown as the "random tie-
breaking rule" line in Figure 2).  In round 1, the highest accepted offer was at $1.15.  
There was a tie, and we accepted 2 of 3 offers at this level.  In each subsequent round the 
maximum accepted offer fell.  In the end, the price was 2-cents below the competitive 
level, and we were able to retire 144 acres.10 
 
Uniform versus Discriminative Pricing 
Next, we tested the effect of the pricing rule used on offers and average prices 
paid in these auctions.  Figure 3 shows the results of several auctions run with the same 
budget, value arrays, and random tie-breaking rule.  We observed a clear tendency for the 
range of offers to lie above values in both uniform and discriminative auctions, especially 
in early offer rounds (see the top panel of Figure 3).  There was little difference in the 
median offer-to-value ratio among accepted offers in the two types of auctions.  In each 
of these auctions, the offer-to-value ratio increased across revision rounds.  In the 
uniform-price auction, the median ratio increased from 1.02 in Round 1 to 1.04 in Round 
6.  Combining the two discriminative auctions, the median ratio increased slightly: from 
1.02 in Round 1 to 1.03 in Round 5. 
In each of these experiments, the maximum accepted price decreased across 
revision rounds.  In the uniform-price auction, this maximum accepted price is the one 
price that is paid for all accepted offers.  Therefore, we can say that the average (uniform) 
price fell across revision rounds in the uniform-price auction.  In contrast, the average 
price in the discriminative auction typically increased over revision rounds.  Many 
                                                 
10 The price was below the competitive level of $1.10 because one subject offered a permit at a price below 
value, and in fact the final price was below the value for this permit.  While this sometimes occurred in 
these sessions, this was not typical of bidding behavior. 
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subjects whose offers were provisionally accepted in early rounds raised their offer price, 
resulting in this increase in the average price paid as more offer submission rounds were 
held.  By the final rounds of the discriminative auction, most accepted offers were at or 
near the market-clearing price, effectively removing any advantage of a discriminative 
pricing rule (see the bottom panel of Figure 3).  So, while average prices are initially 
lower in the discriminative auction, this difference tends to diminish or disappear as 
bidders are allowed to revise their offers.  This is shown in Figure 4, which displays the 
average prices paid for these auctions. 
At this point in our research it became clear to us that the uniform price auction 
wouldn’t be seriously considered by the EPD.  Therefore all remaining experiments used 
the discriminative auction. 
 
Scale of the Experiment  
 All of our initial experiments were conduc ted in groups of nine participants.  
However, we wanted to ensure that the procedures and results were robust to changes in 
the scale of the experiment.  Using the discriminative auction with revisions (randomly 
choosing among tied offers), we conducted one session with 20 participants and another 
session with 42 participants.  None of our key results were affected by this increase in the 
number of participants.  The highest accepted offer declined across revision rounds while 
the average price paid generally increased.  However, average prices remained near 
competitive levels despite attempts to collude.  Figure 5 shows the average price paid 
across offer revision rounds in the 20-person and 42-person discriminative auctions.  The 
competitive price in the 20-person auction was $1.26, and 40-cents higher in the 42-
person auction.  This increase in values was done both to disguise the competitive price 
for those who had participated in a previous auction, and also to increase payoffs for this 
auction (which lasted almost four hours).  For comparability, 40 cents was subtracted 
from the average price paid in the 42-person auction before constructing the graph. 
Attempts at collusion in these experiments were quite explicit, but unsuccessful.  
Some subjects stood up to address the group, encouraging all to submit high offers.  
People worked together in groups, and at times a single person would turn in offer 
submission cards for all of those in the group. 
 
 -17- 
 
Information About Cutoff Offers 
 In retrospect, the increase in average accepted price over revision rounds in our 
discriminative auctions made sense.  Those who initially submitted very low offer prices 
observed the highest accepted offer, and therefore had clear information about the price 
others were receiving in the auction.  The incentive for low-valued participants to 
increase their offer was clear, and they responded to this incentive.  A typical pattern of 
behavior is shown in Figure 6, which shows the offer price submitted for 3 participants in 
the 42-person auction experiment.  After receiving a provisional acceptance, bidders 
typically raise their offer price.  Sometimes this increase is gradual; others increase their 
offer by a large amount.  After being excluded in a subsequent revision round the subject 
then tends to decrease the offer again in order to get back into the market.  Given that the 
maximum accepted offer typically falls across revision rounds, some subjects never again 
receive a provisional acceptance (as was the case for Subject 1). 
 Because the announcement of the highest accepted offer had this effect, we 
conducted additional (small-group) sessions in which we announced accepted offers 
(identified by permit ID number), but did not announce the highest accepted offer price.  
Figure 7 shows the average price paid in one of these sessions.  As anticipated, we 
observed an initial decline in the average accepted offer price.  However, we were 
surprised to see this average price begin to increase again (very gradually) after several 
offer revision rounds.  Looking at the individual data, however, helps to explain this.  
Subjects were quite sophisticated in how they used information.  Recall that each subject 
had three permits with heterogeneous values.  Typically, a participant offered each permit 
at a different price.  Therefore, if two offers were accepted, this gave an upper-bound on 
the amount by which the lower offer could be relatively safely revised upwards.  If only 
one offer was accepted, the participant often experimented with the offer price on one or 
both permits to ascertain the highest accepted price.  Still, given the initial decline in 
offer prices and the fact that some risk averse subjects did not revise provisionally 
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accepted offers, we concluded that this may be a more effective way to release 
information about which offers were accepted.11 
  
V. FIELD EXPERIMENTS 
Two experiments were conducted in southwest Georgia, using somewhat different 
subject pools.  The first utilized 22 adult subjects in Albany, Georgia.  Most of these 
participants were farmers in the affected area.  In order to simplify procedures, and 
expedite instructions, subjects were each given two "vouchers." Each voucher had a 
redemption value printed on the face of it.  If the voucher was retained the subject 
received this redemption value in cash.  If it was sold, the participant earned his or her 
offer price.  This is equivalent to a permit that covers a single acre (so that the per-acre 
price received is identical to the redemption value for the voucher). 
These subjects first participated in a sealed bid (no revision) discriminative 
auction.  After turning in an offer, and before any results were announced, they next 
participated in a discriminative auction with revisions.  No information on the highest 
accepted offer was released: only those permits whose offers were provisionally 
accepted.  A fixed budget constraint was not used in this session: the lowest 15 offers 
were accepted without consideration of the amount of money it took to purchase these 
vouchers.12  The distribution of voucher values (which was approximately uniform in this 
auction, as shown on the left side of Figure 8) was also different from previous auctions. 
Data from these auctions are shown on the right side of Figure 8.  The average 
accepted offer was higher in the first round of the auction with revisions than in the one-
shot sealed offer auction ($21.05 compared with $19.80).  Moreover, the opportunity cost 
of obtaining 15 vouchers was only 7.5 percent higher than the minimum opportunity cost 
in the one-shot compared with 12.5 percent in the first offer submission round of the 
auction with revisions.  However, after round 1 the average accepted price was lower in 
each revision round than in the one-shot auction.  With one exception (round 6) the  
                                                 
11 See Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey (2002) for references and new evidence relating to risk aversion in private 
value auctions. 
12 When the EPD released the initial auction rules for public comment it proposed either a sealed offer 
auction, or a sealed offer with revisions.  This session was held after the release of these draft rules to 
educate farmers on the proposed rules, and also to obtain data that compared the two institutions.  The 
farmers were paid for participation. 
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opportunity cost of obtaining these vouchers was lower in the auction with revisions.  
The average accepted price dropped dramatically between the first and second offer 
rounds (from $21.05 to $19.25).  The average accepted offer was at its minimum in 
Round 3 ($18.71), but only increased slightly after this, remaining fairly steady just under 
$19.00 through the remaining five rounds.  This pattern is quite like that observed in our 
other auctions in which the maximum accepted offer was not announced (see Figure 7, 
above). 
By late January the EPD had approved our recommended auction rules (described 
in Section VI below), and it appeared likely that a drought would, in fact, be declared.  
We therefore conducted a multi-site experiment that field-tested the auction preparations.  
We had several concerns that were addressed in this field experiment.  First, we wanted 
to determine what facilities would be needed for the EPD auction.  In addition, this was 
our first large-scale test of the auction software.  This experiment allowed us to ensure 
that the software could handle data entry at multiple locations, with a variety of computer 
systems, and expeditiously transfer information about bids and provisionally accepted 
offers between the auction sites in Southwest Georgia and the central processing location 
in Atlanta. 
This field experiment was conducted at two sites in southwest Georgia, all located 
within the Flint basin. 13  Most of the participants were high school and college students.  
However, some farmers (who wanted to participate in a live demonstration of the auction 
procedures) also participated in the auction.  A total of 50 subjects participated in the 
field test, with bid collection and processing done via a web-based program that enabled 
the EPD officia ls in Atlanta to follow the bidding.   In fact, the director of the EPD and 
several others from his office were present to watch this trial auction. 
The parameters and procedures were identical to the Albany field experiment, 
except that a budget constraint was enforced and only a single (iterative) auction was 
conducted.  All subjects were given two vouchers at the start of the auction.  Each 
voucher represented a single acre, and the values were approximately uniformly 
distributed from $15.00 to $22.50.  We utilized a target of 55 vouchers, and a budget of 
                                                 
13  As described below, we intended to conduct this experiment at three locations. 
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$975 to purchase these vouchers.  As in our laboratory experiments, the budget was 
common information among all participants, however the voucher target was not 
announced.  At the competitive (uniform) equilibrium, 50 vouchers could be purchased at 
a price between $18.50 (the value of the last four vouchers) and $19.  This is just short of 
the target number of vouchers (55).  Of course, because we were using a discriminative 
auction it is possible that more offers could be accepted if the average accepted offer was 
less than $19.  After all offers were submitted at both sites, they were combined and 
ranked in order from lowest to highest offer price.  Starting with the lowest prices, offers 
were provisionally accepted until either 55 vouchers were obtained or the cost of 
obtaining another voucher put the total cost above $975.  In the case of a tie at the cutoff 
value, offers at this level were randomly chosen for provisional acceptance.  Provisional 
winners were posted, using the permit ID number associated with accepted offers.  No 
information about the cutoff value was announced. 
On average, offers in this treatment started very low.  In the first round, 55 offers 
were accepted at an average price of $17.58.  However, there appeared to be some 
confusion among the subjects: almost 20 percent of all offers were below value (see 
Figure 9).  Over time, however, the subjects appeared to learn about the incentives, quite 
possibly through conversations with other auction participants.  In the final three rounds 
50 offers were accepted – the competitive prediction – at an average price between 
$19.30 and $19.35 in each of these three rounds.  The opportunity cost of these 50 
vouchers was 7 percent above the minimum possible to obtain 50 vouchers.  Individual 
behavior was very similar to that observed in our lab experiments.  Across revision 
rounds, those subjects who submitted initial low offers increased them (see the left side 
of Figure 9), while those who submitted high offers reduced them (right side of Figure 9).  
By the final offer submission round, the distribution of offers was close to uniform. 
There were some unexpected procedural difficulties during this trial auction.  We 
intended to use three sites for this auction, but officials at one location forgot to send 
someone to unlock the building.  We discovered problems with computer “firewalls” that 
inhibited communication between sites (specifically with a chat-room that was set up for 
site-supervisors to communicate with one another).  Moreover, we expected to use 
cellular phones to communicate between auction sites and the central processing location 
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in Atlanta; however, cellular coverage was unreliable at all of the remote sites.  Finally, 
we encountered trouble with the software that was used to print receipts (showing the 
final auction outcomes and payments to be received).  This trial auction provided us with 
valuable guidance about remaining preparations that needed to be completed.  However, 
it also convinced us that a multi-site auction with a diverse collection of computer 
facilities and a large number of bidders was feasible. 
 
VI.  THE FLINT RIVER DROUGHT PROTECTION ACT AUCTION 
 After attending our 42-person laboratory experiment and studying results from 
our other sessions, the EPD implemented our recommended procedures: a discriminative 
price auction with revisions, with no maximum accepted price announcement, and a 
random tie-breaking rule. 
The EPD’s Flint River Drought Protection Act Auction was conducted on 
Saturday, March 17, 2001 at eight sites in the Flint River Basin. 14  Two weeks prior to the 
auction, all eligible participants were sent instructions that detailed the auction 
procedures and directed them to the eight sites.15  On the day before the auction, eligible 
permit-holders could register to participate at any one of the auction locations.  A total of 
576 permits (covering 98,170 acres) were certified as eligible for the auction.  Of these, 
about two-thirds were registered to participate in the auction.  A total of 194 farmers 
registered to make offers for 347 permits, totaling 61,806 acres.  The acreage associated 
with these permits ranged from 4 to 1442 acres.  Although we have some information 
about the crops (and associated prices) in this part of the state, we do not observe the 
values that the farmers associate with each irrigation permit.  Instead, we can only 
observe the offers that they make on each permit.  In all rounds, the per-acre offer prices 
ranged from $0.01 to $8,000.  Arguably, the offers at these extremes weren't serious 
                                                 
14  There was one site supervisor and two EPD representatives at each of the eight auction sites.  In addition 
we hired a total of 58 people to work at the eight locations.  These workers collected bids from farmers, 
entered bids on the computer, and worked with farmers as they verified that offers were entered correctly.  
We gratefully acknowledge the help of Maribeth Coller, who helped lead auction preparations, trained 
these workers, and supervised an auction site.  We also thank the other site supervisors: Lisa Anderson, 
Paul Ferraro, Ann Gillette, Laura Taylor, and Mark Van Boening (two of the authors supervised the 
remaining two auction locations). 
 
15 These instructions are in the appendix. 
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offers.  In fact, the person who made the 1-cent per acre offer (for a permit that covered 
20 acres) stated that he was doing so as a protest.16  The $8,000 per-acre offer was for a 
permit associated with a four-acre tract of land.  About 85 percent of the acreage in the 
auction was offered at prices from $100 through $500. 
 Figure 10 shows the array of offers, for those offers that range up to $500 (this 
comprised just over 90 percent of all offers).  Figure 11 shows a close-up view of these 
offers; the three panes divide offers into low (less than $130), medium ($130 - $210), and 
high ($220 - $500) offers.17    Over the revision rounds offers typically declined (though 
there were some small increases at the low-end of the offer arrays, especially in the third 
and fourth rounds).  Although the maximum accepted offer was not announced (only the 
permit ID numbers of those offers that were provisionally accepted), some farmers 
communicated both within and between the eight auction locations.  For example, at the 
Webster County site (where approximately 20 percent of the permits and acreage were 
offered) some participants encouraged others to submit at an offer price of $200 per acre.  
Moreover, they asked one another whether their offers had been accepted, and at what 
price.  Several had cellular phones and called people at other auction locations in order to 
obtain the same information.  Therefore, we can conclude that they had at least some 
information (though not perfect) about the range of accepted offers.  In the fourth round, 
there were 55 offers submitted at $125 per acre, but only 42 of these were accepted.  
Several participants apparently forgot the random tie-breaking rule that was described in 
the mailed instructions; participants at several sites questioned why some offers were 
accepted at this level, but not others.  The tie-breaking rule was publicly explained at 
these auction locations.  Therefore, it is quite likely that many participants knew that 
$125 was the maximum accepted price in the fourth round and that not all offers at this 
level were accepted.  In fact, 14 of these offers were lowered in the next (and final) 
round.  Surprisingly, these 14 offers were about evenly divided between offers that had 
been provisionally accepted (8 offers) and rejected (6 offers) in Round 4. 
                                                 
16 This person never cashed the resulting 20-cent check that he received.  Instead, he had it framed and has 
been pictured with it in several news stories, while criticizing the auction. 
 
17 Very high offers (those greater than $500) changed very little across revis ion rounds. 
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 During the auction, the EPD director made all decisions regarding the conduct of 
the auction.  In particular, he chose the rule used to determine which offers were 
accepted, and how many offer submission rounds to hold.  Unlike the laboratory 
experiments that we conducted (and over our strenuous objections), he did not use a fixed 
budget, acreage target, average price, or maximum accepted price during the auction.  
This is shown in Table 1, which lists the maximum and average accepted price, the 
cumulative number of acres, and the cumulative cost of all provisionally accepted offers 
during each round of the EPD auction.  There was little change in the maximum accepted 
offer price in the first four offer rounds.  However, the EPD director increased the 
average accepted offer price from $105 in the first round to $113 in Round 4, increasing 
the total number of acres that were provisionally accepted. 
 We were concerned that the round-by-round increase in the average accepted 
offer price would reduce competitive pressures in the market.  In fact, the number of 
acres covered under provisionally accepted offers decreased between rounds 3 and 4, 
while the average price was essentially held constant (at $112.36 in round 3, and $113 in 
round 4).  Anticipating the end of the auction, we encouraged the EPD Director to remain 
firm in the maximum accepted offer price in round 4, hoping this would encourage 
farmers to reduce their offers in the subsequent offer submission round.  In fact (as noted 
above) this happened.  The fifth line of Table 1 shows the result that would have been 
obtained had the maximum average price of $113 been enforced in round 5.  Over 3,500 
more acres would have been taken out of irrigation than in round 4, and the maximum 
accepted price would have been unchanged at $125 per acre.  In reality, the EPD director 
chose to accept all offers through $200 an acre in the fifth (final) offer submission round 
(see the last line of Table 1).  In the end, a total of 33,006 acres were taken out of 
irrigation at a total cost of almost $4.5 million (an average price of. $135.70 per acre). 
 Because a consistent rule was not used during the auction it is difficult to directly 
compare the outcome of the auction across revision rounds (or compare it to the results 
from our experiments).  However, by fixing a rule and observing what the outcome would 
have been in each round using the fixed rule, we can approximate this analysis.  Table 2 
shows this for several different rules that might be used in an auction of this type – target 
acreage, average accepted price constraint, and a fixed budget constraint. 
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 The top section of the table compares results that would have been attained if an 
acreage target had been used.  For example, in the first line the target number of acres is 
8,000 (just over the actual number obtained in the first round of the auction).  If this had 
been the EPD director’s goal, he could have attained 8,000 acres at an average price of 
$107.67 per acre in round 1, and $99.18 per acre in round 5.  The number in bold (in this 
case, $98.90 in round 3) shows the best outcome that would have been attained in any 
offer submission round.  The next two lines show the same comparison for higher 
acreage targets.  The middle section of the table assumes an average price constraint was 
used, while the last section of the table assumes a fixed budget constraint was in effect.  
For all three sets of comparisons, constraints were chosen that were consistent with the 
actual targets used in the first, middle, and late rounds of the auction.  For example, in 
Round 1 the average price of provisionally accepted offers was $105, in Rounds 3 and 4 
the average accepted offer was close to $113, and $136 in the final offer round. 
 With one exception (8,000 target acreage) the best outcome that would have been 
attained using any of the three rules would have been achieved in Round 5.  This 
demonstrates the benefit of allowing farmers to revise their offers.  Even though the 
distribution of offers did not change substantially (Figures 10 and 11), those changes that 
did occur generally allowed the EPD to obtain a greater number of acres at a lower price.  
Holding the average accepted price essentially constant between Rounds 3 and 4 was 
helpful in lowering Round 5 offer prices.  By most measures, the Round 4 outcome was 
worse than that observed in Round 3.  However, as we note above, offer prices decreased 
in Round 5, which led to the improved final-round outcome (relative to any previous 
offer submission round). 
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
 Auctions are commonly used for perishable commodities like fish and flowers, 
and they are also used in public settings where fair access is important.  Auctions can be 
desirable relative to administrative proceedings, since the bids convey important private 
information about value.  The use of an auction for irrigation reduction in Georgia was 
attractive for these reasons, and in particular because of the narrow time window between 
the state-mandated drought declaration date (March 1) and the March 25 deadline to 
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finalize the auction outcome. The auction also let farmers’ bids reveal (at least indirectly) 
their willingness to forego irrigation on designated tracts of land for the current growing 
season.  This avoided the anguish, inefficiency, and administrative problems of 
involuntary usage shutdowns using non-economic (geographic and precedence) criteria. 
There are many ways to set up an “auction- like process” called for in the 
legislation, and we used laboratory experiments to sharpen our thinking on a number of 
issues: the pricing rule (uniform or discriminatory), the closing rule (with or without bid 
revision rounds), and how provisional results would be reported after each bid revision 
round. The auctions being envisioned were relatively complex environments for the 
bidders (student subjects and farmers), and we devoted considerable effort to coming up 
with a procedures and instructions that were relatively easy to understand. The laboratory 
experiments enabled us to make recommendations about rules (on tie breaking and 
information provision) that augmented competition, even in laboratory situations where 
socializing and collusion were facilitated.  
After attending our 42-person laboratory experiment, the EPD implemented our 
recommended auction institution: an iterative discriminative auction.  A multi-site field 
experiment provided a glimpse of how farmers would behave, and of what was needed to 
scale up the web-based procedures to handle hundreds of bidders at eight locations in 
Southwest Georgia.  The EPD auction held on March 17, 2001 resembled the laboratory 
and field experiments in some (but not all) respects, and it was considered a success. 
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Table 1.  Results from the March 17, 2001 Irrigation Auction 
 
Offer 
Round 
Maximum 
Price 
Cumulative 
Acres 
Cumulative 
Cost 
Average 
Price 
1 $130 7,311 $766,771 $104.88 
2 $127 12,755 $1,401,843 $109.91 
3 $127 17,061 $1,917,036 $112.36 
4 $125 15,854 $1,791,449 $113.00 
$125 19,406 $2,192,789 $113.00 5 $200 33,006 $4,478,842 $135.70 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Results from the March 17, 2001 Irrigation Auction 
Results Under Alternative Cutoff Rules 
Key: Bold figure is the best outcome from any offer round 
 
Acreage 
Target Average Cost of Acquiring Target Number of Acres 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 
8,000 107.67 101.90 98.90 102.08 99.18 
16,000 132.53 115.14 111.61 113.14 110.59 
32,000 177.78 152.43 140.35 137.57 113.94 
      
Average Price 
Constraint 
Number of Acres That Would Be Obtained 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 
$105 7,311 9,604 10,677 9,436 11,386 
$113 8,977 14,886 17,061 15,740 19,406 
$136 17,110 25,130 29,912 31,081 33,006 
      
Fixed 
Budget 
Average Cost of Acquiring Acres Obtained Within Fixed Budget 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 
$1 million 111.31 104.64 102.81 104.91 102.42 
$2 million 130.01 116.79 112.36 114.01 111.89 
$5 million 170.26 152.43 145.22 143.58 141.74 
 
Figure 1.  Comparing Uniform, Discriminative, and Uniform Auction with 
Revisions  
(average price of accepted offers and inefficiency in each offer round) 
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Figure 2.  The Effect of Tie-Breaking Rules in a Uniform-Price Auction 
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Figure 3.  Distribution of Offers: Uniform and Discriminative Auctions  
key: uniform (crosses); discriminative (dots) 
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Figure 4.  Average Price Paid in Uniform and Discriminative Price Auctions  
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Figure 5.  Average Price Paid in Discriminative Auctions: 
20- and 42-subject auctions  
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Figure 6.  Time Series of Individual Offers in a Discriminative Auction 
Key: Accepted Offers: Squares; Rejected Offers: Triangles 
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Figure 7.  Average Price Paid in a Discriminative Auction: 
Highest Accepted Price is Not Announced 
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Figure 8.  Comparing a One-Shot Discriminative Auction with a Discriminative 
Auction with Revisions  
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Figure 9.  Offer Arrays from Field Test of Discriminative Auction Procedures 
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Figure 11.  Offer Arrays from the EPD Irrigation Auction 
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APPENDIX: INSTRUCTIONS
The experiment today will consist of an  auction.  We will record your earnings on the receipt form
provided, and your total earnings will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.  The funds that we
will use to pay you have been provided by various foundations, and we will use the receipt form to get
reimbursed for the cash that we will pay you today.  Feel free to write on these instructions if you would like
to.
Some of you may have participated with us in a similar auction.  We should emphasize that the rules
of this auction may be different, and the value numbers that we are using today are different from those that we
have used in the past.
In this auction, each of you will be in the position of a farmer who has three “permits” to irrigate acres
of land.  These irrigation permits allow you to irrigate the land and earn money on crops that you grow.  We
(the experimenters) are in the position of a government agency charged with controlling water use.  We will use
an auction-like process to buy some of these permits back from you in order to reduce the amount of water
being taken from river and ground water reserves in this area.
We will first explain how your earnings are determined, and then we will explain the rules for the
auction.
Earnings in this Experiment
Please take a minute to look at the offer cards that are located on the inside cover of your participant
folder.  The first card looks like the transparency that I am displaying, although the numbers on this
transparency are different than those on your own offer card.  We will talk about the information given to you
on the left side of this card first.
Notice that you have three water permits.  Each permit identification code begins with a letter (or pair
of letters).  We will use these letters to distinguish the offers submitted by each of you.  No one else has the
same identification letters that as anyone else in the room.
Each of your three permits provide irrigation for a number of acres of land.  The number of acres served
by each permit is written in the second column of offer card.  For example, on my sample card, my first permit
provides irrigation for 12 acres of land, my second permit provides irrigation for an additional 20 acres of
land, and my third permit provides irrigation for an additional 16 acres of land.  So my three permits together
irrigate a total of 48 acres of land.  Please look at your own card to see how many acres of land each of your
permits will irrigate.
If you decide to irrigate the land (which occurs when you do not sell your permit), your per-acre
earnings for each tract of land associated with the permit are shown in column (3).  For example, on my
sample offer card, if I keep my first water permit (ZZ1) and therefore irrigate this tract of land, I will earn $3.00
for each of the 12 acres served by this permit.  If I keep permit ZZ2, I will earn $3.40 for each of the 20 acres
served by permit S2.  If I keep permit ZZ3, I will earn $3.75 for each of the 16 acres served by this permit.
Now look at the per-acre earnings numbers written in column (3) on your earnings sheet.  This is your
own private information; you do not have to share it with anyone.  Some of your permits may serve tracts of
land with higher per-acre earnings than other permits.  This reflects the fact that some land is more productive
than other land.  The numbers on your earnings sheet may also be different from the numbers written on others’
sheets.
The per-acre earnings numbers in column (3) can only be obtained if that land is irrigated, i.e. if you
do not sell the water permit that you have for that tract.  In today’s experiment, the per-acre earnings range
from about $0.95 to $2.40; notice that the value numbers on my sample earnings sheet are all higher than this,
and are used only to illustrate how this information will be presented to you.
If you sell the permit, your earnings for that land will be zero for this planting season.  However, you
will  receive an amount of cash in exchange for your permit.
You may earn money in two ways: by keeping one or more of your permits (and therefore irrigating
that land) or by selling one or more of your permits.  We will first show you how your earnings will be
calculated for those permits you keep; next we will show you how your earnings will be calculated for those
permits you sell.  After this, we will show you how the price at which you may sell your permits is determined
in the auction.
For every permit that you do not sell, you will earn your per-acre value (shown in the third column)
multiplied times the number of acres that permit serves (shown in the second column).  For example, if I did
not sell my first permit (and therefore irrigated these 12 acres of land), I would earn $3.00 x 12 acres = $36
from keeping this permit.  If I did not sell my second permit, I would earn $3.40 x 20 acres = $68 from
irrigating these 20 acres of land.  If I did not sell my third permit, I would earn $3.75 x 16 acres = $60 from
irrigating these 16 acres.
As we told you earlier, if you sell a permit you will not be able to irrigate the land covered by that
permit.  Therefore, you will not receive the per-acre earnings numbers written in the third column of your offer
card.  Instead, you will receive a per-acre price multiplied times the number of acres that your water permit
irrigates.  
EXAMPLE 1.  Earnings Calculations with a Per-Acre Selling Price of $6
For example, suppose that the per-acre price were $6.  (This is just an example to show you how your earnings
would be calculated.  Follow along with the calculations I am making on the trasparency.  If you wish to take
notes on this, please do so on these instructions and not on your earnings sheet).  For each permit that I offer
for sale, I would then receive $6 multiplied times the number of acres the permit irrigates.  I will make these
calculations now on my sample earnings sheet.  For example, I would receive $6 x 12 acres = $72 for my first
permit; I would receive $6 x 20 acres = $120 for my second permit, and I would receive $6 x 16 acres = $96
for my third permit.
It is important that you understand that if you sell a permit you will not receive the per-acre value shown
in column 3 (but you will receive the sales price multiplied times the number of acres covered).  If you do not
sell a permit you will not receive the sales price, but you will receive the per-acre value shown in column 3
(multiplied by the number of acres covered).  You will receive one or the other, but you will never receive both
amounts of money for the same permit.  It is possible, however, that you may sell some of your permits, but
not all of them.  In this case, you would receive the per-acre value of the land for those permits that you did
not sell and the sales price for those permits you did sell.
For example (and still supposing the price were $6 per acre):
If I sold no permits, my earnings would be:  $36 (for irrigating the land served by permit S1) + $68
(for irrigating the land served by permit S2) + $60 (for irrigating the land served by permit S3).
If I sold permit S1 at a price of $6 per acre, my earnings would be: $72 (for selling permit S1) + $68
(for irrigating the land served by permit S2) + $60 (for irrigating the land served by permit S3).
The earnings would be determined similarly if I had sold two or three permits.
Whether or not you sell a permit is determined by two things:  your per-acre offer to sell your permit,
and the final maximum accepted per-acre offer.  These determine whether you sell a permit in the following
manner:
If your (per-acre) offer to sell a permit is LESS THAN the final maximum accepted offer, you will sell
your permit.
If your (per-acre) offer to sell a permit is GREATER  THAN the final maximum accepted offer, you will
not sell your permit.
We will explain in a moment what happens if your (per-acre) offer price is equal to the final maximum
accepted offer.
Next we will explain the rules for today’s auction and how this final maximum accepted offer is determined.
Instructions for Today’s Auction
We have a cash reserve to purchase these irrigation permits in this auction.  The amount of money in
this cash reserve is: $__________.  You can think of this as money set aside by the legislature for the specific
purpose of buying water permits in a given season.  It can only be used to purchase water permits from you.
The money that you earn from growing crops (for those tracts on which you keep your water permit) comes
from a different source.
This auction works as follows.  You will fill out an offer submission card, which is the right half of the
card we have been looking at.  You have been given several copies of this offer submission card.  We don’t
know yet how many of these offer submission cards we will use today.  How this is determined will be
explained shortly.
Please look once again at the top card in this stack as I display it on my transparency.  On the right side
of this card, we ask that you write down the per-acre price at which you would be willing to sell this permit.
You will write this in the blank space to the right of the column showing the number of acres that can be
irrigated by each permit.  (You should also write this per-acre offer price on the left side of the card so that you
have a record of the offer that you made.)
You may offer to sell no (zero) permits, one, two, or all three of your permits.  If you want to sell your
first permit, then in the space next to your first permit (on my card, this would be ZZ1) write in the per-acre
price you would be willing to accept in order to sell this permit.  If you want to sell your first two permits, then
you would write a per-acre price next to your first permit and another price next to your second permit.  If you
wish to sell all three of your permits, you would write a price amount next to all three of your permits.  You may
ask the same price for each permit, or you may ask different prices for each permit. If you do not wish to sell
one or more of your permits, put a check-mark in the box labelled “Do Not Want to Sell” next to any of your
permits that you do not want to offer for sale at any price.
When you are done filling out your offer card, please bring it to one of the designated computers.
After everyone has turned in their offer, we will use our cash reserves to buy back some of the water
permits.  We have a goal for the number of permits that we would like to purchase, but we cannot tell you how
many this is.  We may use some or all of our cash reserve (which is $__________) for this purpose.  We will
purchase the permits with the lowest submitted offer prices.
If we buy a permit from you, we will pay you your own per-acre offer price for each permit that you
sell (multiplied by the number of acres that permit serves).  Therefore, if you submitted different offer prices for
each permit you sold you would receive different per-acre prices for each permit.  Also, the per-acre price you
receive may be different than the price another person receives.  For example, if we purchased 3 permits and
the per-acre offer prices on these permits were $10, $12 and $11, we would pay $10, $12, and $11,
respectively, for each of these permits.  This per-acre price would then be multiplied times the number of acres
served by the permit to determine the farmer’s total earnings from selling that permit (just as in Example 1).
Anyone who submitted an offer of an amount greater than $12 (the final maximum accepted offer) would not
sell their permit and would, instead, earn the per-acre amount written on the left side of your offer submission
forms (multiplied by the number of acres served by that permit).  If you do not sell your permit, you will earn
this per-acre amount (multiplied by the number of acres that the permit serves) regardless of whether you
offered that permit for sale or not.
Suppose that the per-acre offers were $10, $11, $12, and $12;  for simplicity we will assume that each
permit irrigates only one acre (although all of your permits irrigate more than one acre of land).  If my budget
was $35 (or, if  my goal was to purchase 3 permits), then I could not purchase both of the permits that had
offers of $12.  To do so would mean purchasing 4 permits (one more than my goal) or spending ($10 + $11
+ $12 + $12) = $45 ($10 more than my budget).  In the event of a tie at the final maximum accepted offer we
will randomly choose among the tied offers.  In this example, we would randomly choose one of the permits
submitted by the two people who submitted $12 offers.  The person whose permit we chose would sell their
permit at a price of $12 and the other person would not sell their permit.
EXAMPLE 2. An auction for post-it note pads.
For this example, I will give each of you a set of post-it note pads. I have $6.00 allocated to buy these
pads back from some of you.  You must decide on the price at which you would be willing to sell the
pad to me.  We cannot tell you how much we paid for these pads.  Instead, you need to think about
what these post-it notes are worth to you, and the price at which you would be willing to sell them to
me.
We will hand out the pads and also a card on which you will submit your offer.  Please write your name
and your offer price on the index card, and then turn it in.  After all offers have been submitted we will
arrange the index cards in order from the lowest offer amount to the highest offer amount.
We will then determine how many pads we can buy back with the $6.00 budget, paying each person
the offer amount that person submitted.  We will show you how we work out how many pads to
purchase (and the maximum accepted offer) as we go through the offers.
After determining how many memo pads we will purchase, we will announce those who sold their pad.
We will pay each of these people the amount of their offer in exchange for their post-it note pad.
Those who submitted an offer that is greater than the maximum accepted offer will not sell their pad
to us.
This auction is just to illustrate how the price and number of units purchased (and therefore the
maximum accepted offer) are determined.  During the actual experiment you will have 3 permits to sell
(and not just one), earnings will be much higher and we will not reveal what anyone offered or which
individuals were able to sell their permits.
EXAMPLE 3. An auction for pens.
For this example, I will give each of you two pens: one blue pen and one black pen.  I have $10.00
allocated to buy these pens back from some of you.  You must decide on the price at which you would
be willing to sell each pen to me.  We will hand out the pens and also an index card on which you will
submit your offers.  Please write your name on the index card, and your offer for each for the pens.
There are spaces on the index card for making offers to sell both pens.  You may ask the same amount
for both pens or different amounts for the two pens.  After all offers have been submitted we will
arrange the the prices in order from the lowest offer amount to the highest offer amount.
We will then determine how many pens we can buy back with the $10.00 budget, paying each person
the offer amount that person submitted.  We will show you how we work out how many pens we will
purchase as we go through the offers.  Even though some of you may prefer blue pens and others of
you may prefer black pens, we do not care which pens we purchase.  We will purchase those pens
with the lowest offer prices, regardless of the color of the pen.
This auction is just to illustrate how the price and number of units purchased are determined.  During
the actual experiment earnings will be higher and we will not reveal what anyone offered or which
individuals were able to sell their permits.  Also, the offer price will be multiplied by the number of acres
your permit serves.
At this point, are there any questions about how the price you receive is determined?
We have already been through several examples, but we would like to work through one more before
you make your decisions in this auction today.  We will only be conducting one auction, and the permits in the
upcoming auction cover a lot of acres with high earnings.  We are going to work through this example to be
sure that you understand just how your earnings will be calculated and how your offer decisions can affect your
earnings.
EXAMPLE 4. Auctioning off “permits” represented by slips of paper.
We are handing each of you a small packet with 6 slips of paper:  2 blue, 2 green, and 2 white.  You
can think of each color as a “permit” and each slip of paper as an acre.  So you have 3 permits, and
each permit irrigates 2 acres.  Written on each of these slips of paper is a number.  This number tells
you how much (in pennies) each acre earns if the acre is irrigated.  This corresponds to the number
written in the third column of your offer submission form (although the numbers written on the slips of
paper are much smaller than those on your earnings sheet).
Next, we are giving you an index card that you will use to submit your offer.  Please write your name
on the index card, and then look at the numbers on your slips of paper.  For every slip of paper you
keep, you will earn the amount written on it (paid to you in pennies).  For every slip of paper you sell
to us, we will pay you the amount you offered.  When you offer a permit for sale, you must specify the
per-acre price that you would be willing to accept in exchange for this permit.  If you sell the permit,
we will pay you twice the per-acre price (determined by your offer price).  This is the price times the
two acres that were served by that “permit.”
After everyone has submitted their offers, we will randomly choose 10 of these bid submissions cards.
Only these 10 people will take part in this example auction (although you will not know in advance
whether your offer will be one of those included in the auction).  After this, we will rank the offers from
lowest to highest.  I have set aside $1.50 for this auction; I will buy as many “permits” as I can with this
$1.50 (and choose randomly among any tied offers).
The land associated with each of your permits may earn different amounts of money if you irrigate it
(that is, if you do not sell your permit).  Therefore you may wish to submit different offer prices for each
of your permits.  However, we will purchase only those permits with the lowest per-acre offer prices;
we will not consider the value of the land to you.
Remember, you will either receive the per-acre price that you offered (if you sell your “permit”) OR
the per-acre price that is written on each slip of paper (if you do not sell your “permit”).   However,
in this example auction only those 10 people that we randomly select will be paid any money.  Earnings
for everyone else will be hypothetical.
We suggest that you look carefully at the value numbers written on these slips of paper.  If you submit
an offer price that is less than your value number, it might be more likely that your offer would be
accepted.  However, in this event you would earn less money than if you had not sold your “permit.”
For example, suppose that I was told that my permit would earn 5-cents per-acre if I used it to irrigate.
If I offered to sell this permit for 4-cents per acre and this offer was accepted I would have only earned
4-cents (multiplied by the two acres) in exchange for selling the permit instead of the 5-cents (multiplied
by two acres) that I would have earned from keeping the permit (and therefore irrigating those two
acres).
When you are ready, please write your offers on your offer card and turn it in to us; please remember
to put your name on your card.
At this time are there any questions about how your earnings are determined?
In today’s auction, after everyone has submitted an offer card, we will order the offers from lowest to
highest and determine how many permits we will  purchase (which would determine the maximum accepted
offer).  When we have done this, we will announce a “Current Maximum Accepted Offer”  What this
means will be explained in just a moment.
If the per-acre offer price you submitted for any of your permits is less than this “Current Maximum
Accepted Offer”, then you would have sold those permits.  For example, suppose current maximum accepted
offer were $5.00 and I offered Permit ZZ1 for a price of $4.50 per acre, Permit ZZ2 for a price of $5.50 per
acre, and Permit ZZ3 for a price of $6.00 per acre.  (Remember that my offers represent the per-acre amounts
that I wish to receive; if I sell a permit we will multiply this price times the number of acres this permit serves).
In this case I would know that I would have sold Permit ZZ1, but that I would have kept Permits ZZ2 and ZZ3.
In the event of a tie, we will anounce the number of tied offers, how many of these permits we would have been
able to purchase (by staying within either our announced budget or the number of permits we would like to
purchase), and which of these permits with tied offers would have been sold (we will announce this only by
using your identification code; for example, “Permits X2 and Q3 would have been sold”).
The transparency that I am displaying at the front of the room shows how this information will be
presented.
These purchases will not actually go through at this time.  In other words, when we announce
this current maximum accepted offer you have not actually sold anything or earned any money.  This is just to
tell you what the outcome of the auction would have been if the auction had ended at this point.  Instead,
once this current maximum accepted offer is announced, everyone will be given 5 minutes to submit  a revised
offer.  Please look at the second offer card in your stack to see how you will submit your second offer.  This
offer card looks just like your first offer card, however there is an additional column on the right side of this card
(this is also shown on this transparency).
If you do not wish to revise your offer for one or more of your permits, then put a check mark in the
box in the far-right column for that permit.  If you do want to revise your offer, enter your revised offer price
in the first column next to that permit or put a check mark in the box indicating that you do not wish to offer that
permit for sale at any possible price.  You may choose to revise your offer on some of your permits, all of your
permits, or none of your permits.
While you are waiting to turn in your offer submission card (or simply waiting for the end of the 5-
minute period), feel free to talk with the others and to enjoy the refreshments.  We will be displaying a clock
that counts down the amount of time remaining in each offer submission period.  We ask that you wait for at
least one minute before submitting your offer.  The clock will turn red after one minute, indicating that you may
submit your offer.
At the end of the 5-minute revision period, we will re-order the offers from lowest to highest, and
determine how many permits we would purchase if the auction were to end.  Then a new current maximum
accepted offer will be announced.
We will then have another 5-minute offer submission period.  This process will continue until either (a)
no one submits a new (revised) offer during a 5-minute submission period; or (b) we (the experimenters) decide
to end the auction.  Remember, none of the results will count toward your final earnings until one of these things
occur.  Also, you will not know in advance which is the final offer submission period.
After one of these events occurs, the current maximum accepted offer will be named the “Final
MaximumAccepted Offer.”  At that time, we will actually purchase those permits whose offer prices were less
than the final maximum accepted offer.  Everyone who submits an accepted offer will be paid their own offer
price for that permit multiplied by the number of acres that permit serves.  In the event of a tie, we will again
randomly choose among all tied offers to determine which permits we actually buy.
We will then prepare an earnings report form for you, which  confirms the number of permits you sold,
your earnings from the permits sold (your per-acre offer price multiplied by the number of acres that the permit
would have irrigated), and your earnings from any permits you did not sell (the per-acre earnings from those
permits multiplied times the number of acres that are irrigated).  Then we will pay you all of your earnings in
cash.  We have the cash required to pay you for all of your permits, whether you sell them to us or not.
Are there any questions?
Please take out your first offer submission card (remove it carefully so that you keep the other cards
in order).  Review the information contained in column 3 on the left.  This tells you what your per-acre earnings
will be for any permits that you do not sell in today’s auction.  You can submit any offer price that you wish.
However, if you submit an offer price that is less than your per-acre value (shown in column 3) and your offer
is accepted, then you will earn less than you would have if you had not sold that permit.
When you are ready, write in the price at which you would be willing to sell each of your permits on
the right side of your offer card.  (If you do not wish to offer one or more of your permits for sale at any price,
place a check mark in the box labelled “do not want to sell” next to that permit.)  Next, write this offer price
on the left side of your offer card and keep this for your own records.  Tear off the right side of your offer card
and turn it in to one of the people at a designated computer.
If you have any questions, please ask one of the people wearing a red Georgia State University baseball
hat.  We ask that you submit your first offer card within the next five minutes.
